














National borders are a big hurdle to the expansion of the open economy. Integration today 
remains imperfect because national borders translate into trading costs, including 
differences in monetary regimes. Political borders shelter many goods and services from 
external competition and, consequently, represent a critical exogenous force in the 
integration process. Borders are thicker for the small countries than the large countries. 
Regional trade arrangements have softened or, in some cases, pushed outward national 
borders, but in the process new borders have emerged. Borders affect also finance and 
monies. While the speed of financial integration suggests currency consolidation and a 
decline in the ratio of independent monies to sovereign nations, the formation of 
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Perfect integration of national markets, just like perfect competition, is an ideal state with 
strong welfare properties. In practice, however, we live in a world of imperfect 
integration, with degrees of imperfection that are changing over time. During the gold 
standard of the late 19
th and early 20
th centuries, national markets were more integrated 
than either in the inter-war period or in the immediate post-World War II period. 
International integration, both real and financial, grew rapidly toward the end of the last 
century. Newspapers and popular literature have referred to this process as globalization. 
But globalization, in the strict sense of complete integration of national markets, never 
existed; nor is it likely to become a reality in the near future. The reason for imperfect 
integration is that many goods and services are sheltered from external competition either 
by transport costs, unfamiliarity with foreign trade practices, or outright protection. 
Political borders translate into thick bands of trading costs and represent a critical   
exogenous force in the integration process. Firms with market power apply strategies that 
enhance market segmentation. National policymakers respond to the pressure from 
domestic producers by  relying on borders to give preference to domestic trade over 
cross-border trade. But domestic biases extend beyond goods and services. Financial and 
money transactions have also a home distortion.  
National borders are changing, albeit slowly, under the pressure of  regional and 
international trade agreements. Regional trade agreements (RTAs) have softened or, in 
some cases, pushed outward national borders and have created in the process new biases. 
Not only there is more trade inside RTAs than across RTAs but integration differs across 




The purpose of the paper is to survey the extent of border-created biases and the 
implications of borders for tests of integration. By design, I avoid two important topics: 
the welfare implications of borders and the political-economy of altering or eliminating 
borders. The rest of the paper consists of three large sections: Section II  on the effect of 
borders on trade in goods and services, Section III on finance, and Section IV on national 
indepedent monies. Conclusions are drawn in Section V. 
 
II.  BORDERS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
The Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) explanation of international trade is one of the most 
cherished theorems in economics. According to HOV, comparative advantage is driven 
by relative factor abundance. The implication is that capital-rich nations export capital-
rich products and labor-rich nations labor-rich products. The problem is that this model 
predicts no better than a coin toss (Bowen et al. 1987). It is hard to explain bilateral trade 
flows without taking into consideration differences in technology (Harrigan 1997; Eaton 
and Kortum 2002). Even better predictions are obtained when, in addition to technology 
differences, consumers are assumed to prefer goods and services produced domestically 
over those produced across the border (Trefler 1995).  The extent of the home bias in 
consumption is positively related to the size of the economy and negatively related to 
transport costs and tariff levels (Trefler, Table 6). 
  Borders create two separate effects. The first, called trading cost, consists of a 
collection of transaction costs and regime costs, such as transport, administration, 
differences in legal systems and practices, languages, networks, competitive policies, and  




The second consists of tariffs or tariff-equivalent restrictions that aim at discriminating 
against foreign producers. While for each producer a tariff is a cost like transport, in the 
aggregate tariffs and tariff-equivalent restrictions redistribute income from foreign 
producers to domestic producers and consumers. Trading costs, unlike tariffs, absorb 
resources that melt away like an ‘iceberg’ as it travels in warm weather.  
 
Gravity model and trade flows  
One way to estimate the border effect is through gravity model of bilateral trade flows. A 
stylized specification of gravity model goes as follows: 
 
(1)  ln(Xijt ) =  α0 +  α1ln(YiYj )t + α2ln(NiNj )t + α3ln(DISTij) +  α4FEATij   + uijt, 
 
where Xij = real exports from country i to country j, Y = real gross domestic product (the 
counterpart of Newton’s masses), N = population (to reflect that larger areas are less 
open), DIST = distance, FEAT = a vector of dummy variables that capture idiosynchratic 
country characteristics, and uij = i.i.d. error term. The vector of dummy variables in 
FEAT can be very large and includes time-invariant factors such as common language, 
common colonizer, and shared land border and relatively exogenous factors such as 
common currency and affiliation to a regional trade agreement (RTA).  α0,  α1, α2, α3, and  
α4 are estimatable parameters, with  α1 having a positive expected sign and  α 2 and α 3 a 
negative expected sign. Distance is a proxy of trading costs as defined above.  
McCallum (1995) applied this equation to 1988 exports and imports among ten 




inter-provincial trade and 0 for province-to-state trade. The gravity model fits the data 
quite. The parameter of interest here is α4, the size of the border effect. Its point estimate 
is approximately 3 and statistically significant under a variety of tests, implying that 
inter-provincial trade is approximately twenty times (exp(3) ~ 20) larger than trade 
between provinces and states. The border between Canada and the United States is wide. 
Helliwell (1996) confirmed these findings with data for the province of Quebec, with the 
obvious intent of underscoring the implied trade consequences of a possible separation of 
this province from Canada. 
McCallum’s findings of very thick borders have been criticized for ignoring  the 
asymmetric impact on trade of barriers between small and large economies and 
multilateral protection levels. Anderson and van Wincoop (2001, Table 1) re-estimate (1), 
using McCallum’s exact specification and data, alternatively from the viewpoint of 
Canada and the United States,  and find that the border from the Canadian viewpoint is 
ten times as wide as from the viewpoint of the United States. Since Canada’s economy is 
approximately one-tenth of the United States’, the level of protection imbedded in a 
border is a positive function of the size of the economy.  Anderson and van Wincoop’s 
gravity equation predicts that trade flows from region i to region j  depend, among other 
factors, on bilateral and multilateral trading costs. When multilateral costs rise relative to 
bilateral costs, trade flows rise between i and j. Furthermore, the smaller the country the 
larger is the fraction of its output exposed to trading costs An increase in protection 
redirects output from outside to inside the border, the degree of which being a positive 
function of the openness of the economy. In sum, protection thickens borders more for 





Convergence tests on prices 
Border effects also show up in prices. The law of one price is the traditional criterion for 
judging whether two markets are integrated. Transportation costs place a natural wedge 
on the law of one price. But even adjusting for transportation costs, prices of the same 
product sold in two different locations may differ because of the power of firms to price 
discriminate. Less than perfect competition is a necessary but insufficient condition for 
market segmentation. If consumers can arbitrage price differences, net of transportation 
costs, market integration can coexist with imperfect competition. In addition to 
transportation costs and domestic price discrimination, national borders add three types of 
potential friction: formal trade barriers in the form of tariff and non-tariff protection, 
informal trade barriers, and exchange rates. Formal trade barriers create a wedge between 
prices paid by consumers in the importing country and prices charged by the firm in the 
exporting country. Informal trade barriers are more difficult to quantify because they find 
their roots in business and social networks. These networks –e.g., groups of the same 
ethnicity or religion, business alliances, and long-term relationships with foreign 
suppliers—facilitate international trade through better flows of transnational information 
and by tempering opportunistic behavior.
  
The link between the exchange rate and the border occurs through the translation 
of foreign-currency prices into domestic currency equivalent. Let Pi
x
 and Pj
x be the price 
of  good x in countries i and j, respectively, denominated in the countries’ respective 
currencies; let Sij be the exchange rate defined as units of currency i per unit of currency 
j. The ratio Pi
x / Sij Pj




country j expressed in the i’s currency, and it is equal to 1 if the law of one price holds. 
The exchange-rate pass-through measures the effects of a depreciation of currency i on 
local prices. Early work by Kreinin (1977) suggested that the exchange-rate pass-through 
- that is, the effect of a currency depreciation on local prices - was much less than 
complete for the United States, Germany, and Japan. Firms can use exchange rate 
changes to price discriminate, a point made by the pricing-to-market literature; for a 
review, see Goldberg and Knetter (1997, pp. 1,252-1,262). For example, Marston (1990) 
finds that Japanese exporters of microwave ovens offset 30 percent of yen appreciation 
by reducing yen export prices. The implication is that Pi
x
  and Pj
x are sticky in relation to 
Sij, and Pi
x / Sij Pj
x  will fluctuate (the higher the correlation between changes in Sij  and in 
Pi
x / Sij Pj
x, the higher the degree of price stickiness). Thus, a variable exchange rate adds 
to the border effect. 
Charles Engel and John Rogers (1996) test the hypothesis that price dispersion of 
similar products is affected not only by distance but by border as well. These authors use 
Canadian and U.S. city price data for fourteen sub-categories of the consumer price 
index. Price dispersion is measured by the sample average of the standard deviation of 
∆ln(Pi
x/SijPj
x), where i and j index cities; the exchange rate is equal to 1 when the pair of 
cities are located in either Canada or the United States. The descriptive statistics indicate 
that dispersion differs from product to product,
1 and is on average higher between across-
the-border cities than within-the-border cities. Engel and Rogers regress price volatility 
on distance and a border dummy, and find strong positive and statistically significant 
                                                 
1 The dispersion is much higher in sectors that have significant product differentiation (e.g., ladies’ apparel 
and footwear) than in sectors that sell relatively homogeneous products (e.g., food and alcoholic 




effects for both. The headline result is that the Canada-US border is equivalent to a 
distance of 75,000 miles. Price stickiness accounts for only part of the border effect. 
Another way of assessing border effects is to compare domestic deviations from 
purchasing power parity with international deviations. Let Pi and Pj be the price index in 
location i and j, respectively. Domestic purchasing power occurs when Pi/Pj = 1, i and j 
being locations using the same currency; international purchasing power occurs when 
Pi/SijPj = 1, i and j being locations separated by a fluctuating exchange rate. Parsley and 
Wei (1996) use prices of 51 products for 48 U.S. cities to estimate the convergence rate 
to (PPP). The authors reject that ln(Pi/Pj) follows a random walk in favor of the 
alternative specification of a zero-mean auto-regressive process of order one. The latter 
yields that implied half-lives deviations from PPP are between four and five quarters for 
tradables, much lower than half-lives deviations in an international context. This 
difference in convergence rates is consistent with a border effect. The implication is that 
if two countries were to adopt the same currency, the border effect would become 
smaller; more on this below. 
  
Regional borders 
RTAs are an important and growing feature of the international trade system; see 
Fratianni and Pattison (2001) and references therein. RTAs have existed since the middle 
of the 19
th century and were an offspring of colonialism. The newer ones have greater 
membership diversity, more of an outward orientation, and seek to go beyond ‘shallow’ 
goods trade liberalization. The EU is the best example of an RTA that pursues ‘deep’ 




establishment of common technical and regulatory standards, customs formalities, and 
government procurement practices. 
 Figure 1 displays raw trade intensity for the main RTAs. Trade intensity is measured 
by the ratio of intra-regional trade to total trade of the region as a proportion of the 
region’s share of world trade. By construction, the measure is equal to one when intra-
bloc trade is as intense as trade between the bloc and the rest of the world. A value in 
excess of 1 indicates that intra-bloc trade intensity exceeds trade intensity with the rest of 
the world. The data indicate that international trade is regionally concentrated. 
Regionalization is sharply rising in the ANDEAN Pact and MERCOSUR, slightly rising 
in the EU and NAFTA, stationary in APEC, and declining in ASEAN. But these ratios 
ignore the fact that some bilateral flows are larger than others because of income, 
population, distance and other relevant variables.  Thus, the relevant question is whether 
a regional trade bias exists after accounting for all the factors that appear on the right-
hand side of (1).  To test for a regional trade bias, (1) is modified as follows: 
 
 
(2)  ln(Xijt ) =   α 0 +  α 1ln(YiYj )t + α 2ln(NiNj )t +  α 3ln(DISTij) +  α 4FEATij   +  
                            +  α 5RTAij  +  α 6MUij + u’ijt, 
 
where a RTA-specific variable has been added to the gravity model to “soak” effects not 
predicted by the pure gravity model, effects that are presumed to stem from preferential 




evidence of  regional trade bias—that is, of positive and significant α5—for ASEAN, 
Australia-New-Zealand CER, Andean Pact, and Mercosur.
2 
                                                 
2 ANDEAN consists of  Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and  Venezuela; ASEAN of  Brunei, 
Darussalam, Cambodia,  Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and 
Vietnam; MERCOSUR of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. 
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         A more refined test involves defining two dummy variables: an intra-bloc dummy 
that acquires a value of one when two countries belong to the same RTA, and an extra-
bloc dummy that acquires a value of one when only one of the two countries belongs to 
the RTA; for a review of this literature see  Soloaga and Winters (2001). The relative size 
of the dummies can tell us something about trade-creation and trade-diversion effects. 
For example, should the intra-bloc dummy be positive and the extra-bloc dummy 
negative, one can compare whether the trade-creation effects, for a given pair of 
countries, are larger or smaller than the trade-diversion effects.  Furthermore and more 
importantly, the sign of the two dummy coefficients can tell us whether the RTAs are 
building or stumbling blocs, where “building” means that RTAs enhance expansion of 
world trade and “stumbling” the opposite. According to the empirical results by Wei and 
Frankel (1997, Table 1), ASEAN , East Asia (excluding ASEAN) and MERCOSUR have 
statistically significant positive intra and extra-bloc coefficients. These RTAs appear to 
have liberalized, not only internally, but also vis-à-vis the rest of the world and 
consequently have helped multilateralism. For EFTA and NAFTA, on the other hand, the 
intra-bloc dummy is positive and the extra-bloc dummy is negative, evidence that is 
consistent with these two RTAs having created a positive internal trade effect but a 
negative external one. Here, regionalism is not consistent with multilateralism. Finally, 
for the EU the intra-bloc dummy is negative and the extra-bloc dummy is positive, 
suggesting that this RTA has generated a negative internal trade effect but a positive 
external one.  
        In sum, the evidence points to a regional border effect for many of the most 




(2000), who estimates the complete (2), that is inclusive of the monetary union dummy 
variable MU, defined to be one when both countries share the same currency in form or 
substance. From the pooled sample Rose (Table 2) obtains a point estimate of  α 5 of 0.99 
(standard error of 0.08), whereas the point estimate of  α6  is 1.21 (standard error of 0.14). 
Since exp(0.99) ~ 2.7, countries that belong to the same RTA trade 170 per cent more 
than countries that do not.  Thus, the regional trade bias is somewhat lower than the 
controversial monetary union effect on trade that will be discussed below. 
  
III. BORDERS AND FINANCIAL INTEGRATION 
Financial integration is much more than high capital mobility, although there is a 
tendency in the macroeconomic literature to treat capital mobility and international 
financial integration as equivalent. High capital mobility is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for financial integration. It takes more than removing restrictions to 
the flows of capital and foreign exchange transactions to achieve global finance. 
Unhampered market access, adoption of financial standards, and non-discriminatory 
financial regulation are part of the requirements for global finance. George von 
Furstenberg (1998, p. 55) makes this point quite vividly by quoting an assessment of 
Markus Lusser, the former President of the Swiss National Bank, on Switzerland, “a 
country that has made the international movement of capital very much its financial 
business, [but] has a domestic economy that is to a large extent divorced from 
international price relations and withdrawn from competition by cartels and government 
regulations.”  Given space limitation, I will stick to tradition and report on the necessary 




  The prevailing wisdom is that whatever the degree of “real” integration in the 
world, financial integration is a notch or two higher. After all, capital, and especially 
finance capital, moves faster than goods, services, and people. Furthermore, modern-day 
capital flows, according to Bordo, Eichengreen, and Irwin (1999), after the long pause of 
the inter-war and Bretton Woods years, have regained and surpassed those of the heyday 
of the classical gold standard.
3 
 
Tests of  integration for financial capital 
Despite the widely held perception of a global financial village, the accumulated 
evidence suggests financial segmentation, with different degrees depending on assets and 
countries. Finance too has borders. 
Typically, tests of financial integration (or for the necessary conditions of 
financial integration) rely on  the law of one price. Take the covered interest rate parity 
(CIRP):  
  (3)  i - i* - fp = (i - i
o) + (i
*o - i*) + (i
o - i*
o - fp),      
 
where i = yield on a domestic assets, i* = yield on a comparable foreign asset, fp =  
forward premium of the foreign currency (spot and forward rates are measured as units of 
domestic currency per unit of foreign currency),  and "o" refers to the offshore location. 
Several factors can explain departures from CIRP:  lack of homogeneity in the underlying 
                                                 
3 Whether capital mobility is higher or lower now than during the gold standard depends to a large extent 
on whether one measures net or gross capital flows. Net capital flows as a proportion of GDP were higher  
during the gold standard, whereas gross capital flows are higher today. Bordo, Eichengreen, and Irwin 
argue that today’s capital flows have a much broader reach, in terms of sectors, than in the late 19




assets, transaction costs, differences in tax rates, differences in credit risk of the issuers, 
and restrictions on capital flows and foreign exchange market.  
  Equation (3) separates departures from CIRP in two locational components and 
everything else. The latter is the CIRP applied to equivalent financial assets traded in the 
same offshore market. Offshore CIRP has been holding for short-term maturities for widely 
traded currencies for quite some time (e.g., Fratianni and Wakeman 1982). The locational 
components reflect controls on capital flows and foreign exchange market as well as 
sovereign risks. Capital controls started in earnest in the early 1930s and petered out, al 
least in much of continental Europe, towards the latter part of 1980s. For example, 
French and Italian tight controls on capital outflows were priced as an exit tax, creating a 
negative difference between onshore and  offshore interest rates in the 1970s and the 1980s 
(Obstfeld 1995, Table 1; Fratianni and Spinelli 2001, Fig. 10.3). Chile, from 1991 to 1998, 
enacted a tax on inflows in the form of a zero interest rate reserve requirement. That tax 
placed a wedge of approximately 3 percentage points between onshore and offshore short-
term interest rates (Herrera and Valdés 2001, Fig. 3).   
  Only for countries that have no capital and foreign-exchange controls and share 
similar sovereign risk can onshore CIRP hold. This has been true of the EU countries in the 
1990s (Holmes 2001). But for the vast majority of countries that have neither offshore nor 
forward markets the relevant parity to be tested is the uncovered interest rate parity.
4 This 
parity does not hold (see, for example, Montiel 1994) and its failure may well result from 
the relative weight of country and currency risk premia and their interactions. For most 
industrial countries, country risk is small relative to currency risk and is relatively stable. 
For emerging market economies, country risk has a larger weight than in industrial 
                                                 
4  Uncovered interest rate parity can be stated as follows: i – i* = (i - i
f)  +  (i
f  - i*), where the new symbol 
i
f is the holding-period yield of a security with similar characteristics of the other two securities, issued by 
the home government and denominated in foreign currency (say U.S. dollar). The term (i - i
f ) captures the 
expected depreciation of the home currency with respect to the foreign currency, whereas the term (i
f  - i*) 
captures the difference between the default risk on the home and foreign security as well as the expected 




countries and interacts with currency risk in a complex way.  For example, in Argentina 
country risk  was larger than currency risk for most of 2000. In October 2001, the 
Argentine central bank estimated currency risk at 21.6 percentage points and country risk 
at 30.3 percentage points (www.bcra.gov.ar, Department of Financial Analysis and 
Information, October 2001). Possibly, country risk was picking up some of the effects of 
the impending demise of the Argentine currency board. 
  In sum, the border effect is imbedded in the two locational terms of (3); these, in 
turn, can spark departures from onshore CIRP even when offshore CIRP holds. National 
policymakers can and have used the border to insulate their national money and capital 
markets from those abroad. It is more difficult to quantify the size of the border effect in the 
absence of offshore markets.  
 
Tests of  integration for physical capital 
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) have challenged the view that markets for physical capital 
are integrated. Using data from sixteen OECD countries for the period 1960-1974, these 
authors show that national investment (in fixed capital) as a ratio of GDP (denoted as I) is 
primarily financed by national saving as a ratio of GDP (denoted as S). In a cross-section 
regression of the type 
 
(4)                                         Ii  =     α  + βSi  + ui              i = country 1, 2, …N, 
 
Feldstein and Horioka tested and failed to reject the null of β = 1 of zero (physical) capital 
mobility. Feldstein and Horioka instigated a vast empirical literature, which found lower 




by Coakley et al. 1998). Moreover, there is plenty of criticism in the literature on what this 
test means for capital mobility. Here are the three most significant ones.  
  The first criticism regards the identifying assumptions underlying β. In a classical 
model the real rate of interest affects I negatively, S positively, and the current-account 
balance B negatively (and hence the capital-account balance positively), subject to the 
equilibrium condition of Si - Ii = Bi, β = Ir /( Ir + Sr + Br ), where Ir, Sr, and Br are the slope 
coefficients of I, S, and B with respect to the real rate of interest (Coakley et al., pp. 172-73). 
β = 1 when both Sr  and Br equal zero, and β = 0 (perfect capital mobility) when either Sr  or 
Br or both tend to infinity. So what drives perfect capital mobility: an infinitely elastic 
saving rate or an infinitely elastic capital account? The identification problem becomes more 
complex with general-equilibrium models. 
 The  second  criticism concerns β and the size of the country. Refer to the equilibrium 
condition Si - Ii = Bi in a world of perfect capital mobility. Assume a shock to S. If the shock 
occurs in a small open economy, the world rate of interest and the national I schedule will 
remain unchanged, and ∆S will be reflected in ∆B: for example, a positive shock implies a 
larger net export of capital, and β  = 0. If the shock occurs in a large economy, the world rate 
of interest and the national I schedule will change. A positive shock implies a lower world 
rate of interest and a higher national I; hence, S and I will be positively correlated, and β > 0. 
Thus, the estimate of β is positively correlated with the size of the economies (Harberger 
1980). The final criticism concerns the use of cross-section data. Typically, the observations 
are averages of long annual time series. Given that the long-run value of Bi = 0 (a country 





 Notwithstanding  these  criticisms, study after study has confirmed the positive 
association between investment and saving, to the point at which now the finding has been 
elevated to the rank of a “major puzzle” in international macroeconomics (Obstfeld and 
Rogoff 2001). It is a puzzle because our strong prior is that capital is mobile, and our prior 
has been fed by the evidence on covered interest rate parity. But CIRP applies to a narrow 
spectrum of financial assets and not to physical capital (Dooley et al. 1987, pp. 522-523). 
For physical capital, the relevant law of one price is real interest rate parity, which can be 
expressed as follows (Frankel and MacArthur 1988):  
 
(5)                           r - r* = (i - i* - fp) + (fp - ∆e) + (∆e - π   + π *) = 0.   
 
The new symbols are  r  = the ex-ante real rate of interest, ∆e = the expected depreciation of 
the home currency, and π  the expected rate of inflation. Equation (5) is consistent with β = 
0  in  (4) (Dooley et al. 1987; Lemmen and Eijffinger 1995). The evidence overwhelmingly 
rejects (5), and not surprisingly. For (5) to hold, three conditions need to be simultaneously 
satisfied: covered interest rate parity (the first term in parentheses in the equation); the 
forward premium as an unbiased estimate of the expected depreciation (second term); and 
expected purchasing power parity (third term). The first of these three conditions, as we 
have noted, has empirical corroboration for few currencies and a very narrow set of assets. 
The second fails miserably (Kang 1992). On the third, we have noted that the half-life of 




(see also Obstfeld and Rogoff 2001). In sum, the failure of real interest rate parity supports 
the basic contention of Feldstein and Horioka that β in (4) is different from zero.
5 
  The Feldstein and Horioka finding seems to be consistent with two home biases, 
one in equities and the other in consumption. The domestic bias in equities is measured 
relative to the asset diversification predicted by the international capital asset pricing model 
(Solnik 1996, Ch. 5). Given historical mean returns and variances, the model predicts that 
the weight of foreign equities should be much higher than the observed weight. The 
discrepancy between predicted and actual weight remains large even under the assumption 
of infinite relative risk aversion (Lewis 1999, Table 2). The bias could stem from the failure 
of the capital asset pricing model to predict diversification, or from the failure of PPP, which 
is a standard assumption of the international capital asset pricing model, or from the failure 
of both; there is no way to distinguish between the two. Various attempts to justify the 
equity home bias have also failed. For some researchers, the bias does not exist because the 
large standard deviations underlying means and variances of returns makes it difficult to 
reject the hypothesis that a domestic-only portfolio is worse than an internationally 
diversified portfolio.
6 
                                                 
5 There is a long list of financial assets whose prices differ significantly across countries. For example, von 
Furstenberg (1998) reviews the evidence on the estimated cost of capital in the United States and Japan and 
insurance premia in countries of the EU. In both cases, differences are too wide to be explained by 
differences in tax rates. 
6The uncertainty problem can be gleaned from the data reported by  Lewis (1999: Table 2) on the sample means and 
standard deviation of  the annualized monthly dollar returns of the  US stock market and the EAFE index (the “foreign” 
stock market) for the period 1970-1996. The foreign stock market average return of 12.12 percent exceeded by almost 
one percentage point the US stock market return of 11.14 percent. However, given that the standard deviations of the 










         The domestic consumption bias is measured relative to the prediction made by a model 
where markets are complete in the Arrow-Debreu sense and countries diversify risks due to 
idiosyncratic shocks (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996, Ch. 5). In this setting, the growth rate of 
domestic consumption is equal to that of foreign consumption. The data clearly refute the 
implication of complete markets (Lewis 1999, Table 1). International risk sharing is not only 
small relative to prediction but smaller than among regions of the same country. In an early 
article on the subject, Atkeson and Bayoumi (1993) show that regional capital flows within 
the United States are larger than among countries. Similar results were obtained for Canada 
(Bayoumi and Klein 1997). Kleimeier and Sander (2000) provide evidence that financial 
integration is primarily a regional phenomenon using data from six core European Union 
countries, Japan and the United States. Not only financial flows but also flows of physical 
capital are more mobile within the regions of the same country than among countries. 
Helliwell (1998) reports the results of a Feldstein and Horioka regression with data from the 
OECD countries and Canadian provinces. The coefficient of the provincial saving variable 
is negative, statistically significant, and of a size comparable to the coefficient of national 
saving, implying that capital is very mobile within Canada.  
  In sum, physical capital is more mobile within the regions of a country than across 
countries. The same is true for finance capital. Finance capital is more mobile than physical 
capital. Financial integration in deep RTAs like the EU is higher than global integration. 
National boundaries are an obstacle to international capital flows and the geographic 
diversification of assets. As it is true for trade, national borders are a constraint to the 
expansion of the open economy. Regional arrangements expand national borders and create 




IV. BORDERS AND MONIES 
For the late Rudi Dornbusch (2001, p. 238): “A century ago, being a civilized country 
meant being on the gold standard.” Then, after the disruption of financial integration in 
the wake of World War I, monies became identified with nations, just like flags and 
airlines. Governments exerted the tightest grip on their monopoly of fiduciary monies: 
currency substitution did not exist and cross-border money flows were limited except for 
the key currencies. Money had been nationalized. Yet, throughout the ages, the norm was 
money competition and cross-border money flows. From the fifth to the seventh century 
the Byzantine nomisma was the unchallenged coin (Cipolla 1956). The nomisma was 
displaced in the Low Middle Ages by the Islamic dinar; and the dinar, in turn, was 
displaced in the higher Middle Ages by the Florentine fiorino, first, and the Venetian 
ducato, later. These coins were the dollars of the Middle Ages, as Cipolla puts it, because 
they had high unitary value, stable purchasing power and were issued by political entities 
with a leading position in international commerce. In more recent time, 1870-1914, the 
British pound rose to the status of dominant currency, reflecting British attachment to the 
gold standard and British supremacy in trade and banking.  
  For the bulk of the 19
th century, monies and nations matched with few exceptions. 
These exceptions tended to be very small open economies with historical ties with the 
countries’ adopted legal tender and often imbedded inside their borders: Andorra, 
Liechtenstein, Monaco, Nauru, Panama, San Marino, Tuvalu, and the Vatican (see Table 
1). The Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union was the lonely bright spot of a cooperative 
MU between sovereign states. Towards the end of  World War II a handful of small islands 




consolidation received a modest boost with the formation of the East Caribbean Currency 
Union in the 1960s, the West African Monetary Union in the 1970s and the Central African 
Monetary Union in the early 1990s; and a big boost with the European Monetary Union of 
1999. All in all, multilateral MUs have been much more significant than unilateral MUs 
like Ecuador’s and El Salvador’s.  









Country  Currency   Population 
(‘000) 
Income per 
capita in US $ 
Pre-World War II  
1278  Andorra  French franc, peseta & euro  69   19,000  
1865  Monaco  French franc & euro  32   27,000  
1892  Tuvalu  Australian dollar  11   1,100   
1897  San Marino  Italian lira & euro  28   34,600 
1904 Panama  US  dollar  2,900 3,260 





Belgian franc in both countries, 
Luxembourg franc in Luxembourg; euro 
See below  see below 
1914  Nauru  Australian dollar  12   5,000  
1926  Vatican City  Italian lira & euro  1  NA 
Post-World War II   
1943 Kiribati  Australian  dollar  93  830 
1944 Marshall  Islands  US  dollar  52  2,190 
1944 Micronesia  US  dollar  120  2,150 











St. Vincent &  Grenadines 
St. Christopher Kitts-Nevis 
St. Lucia 
East Caribbean dollar; 






























CFA franc; regional central 






















Central African Republic 
Chad 
Republic of Congo 
Equatorial Guinea (1985) 
Gabon 
CFA franc; regional central 































euro; common central bank   8,100 
10,300 






















2000 Ecuador  US  dollar  12,900  1,080 
2001 El  Salvador  US  dollar  6,400 2,040 
 
Sources: Central Intelligence Agency, Factbook; Clément et al. (1996, Box 1); Cohen (1993, 
Appendix); Edwards (2001, Table 1); Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001, Table 1); 
Statesman’s Yearbook, various years; World Bank, World Development Indicators Database; 
World Currency Yearbook, various years. 
 
Notes: Population and income per capita, in current US dollars, are from the World Bank, World 
Development Indicator  Database; otherwise (indicated with an asterisk) from the CIA, Factbook. 
Income per capita are GNI for the World Bank and GPD for the CIA.The data are the most 
recent. The countries listed above are independent states. The number of unilateral currency 
unions would be longer if we were to consider dependencies, colonies and self-governing regions, 
such as the Channel Islands (pound), Cocos Islands (Australian dollar), Cook Island (New 
Zealand dollar), Northern Cyprus (Turkish lira), Greenland (danish krone), Guam (US dollar), 
Montenegro (euro), Niue (New Zealand dollar), Norfolk Island (Australian dollar), Northern 
Mariana Islands (US dollar), Pitcairn Island (New Zealand and US dollars), Puerto Rico (US 
dollar), Saint Helena (pound), American Samoa (US dollar), Tokelau (New Zealand dollar),   
Turks and Caicos Islands (US dollar), British Virgin Islands (US dollar), US Virgin Islands (US 





The OCA literature and extensions 
What defines an optimal MU? Are there too many MUs? How many of them should there 
be? These are the questions raised by the optimal currency area (OCA) literature. If the 
selection criterion were the efficiency of money as a medium of exchange, the answer 
would be easy: since the usefulness of money rises the more people use it, the world 
would the optimal area. But there is more than one criterion. The early OCA literature 
tried to give an answer to the question of what exchange rate regime is best suited to 
achieve simultaneously a country’s internal balance (non-inflationary trend output) with 
external balance (sustainable balance-of-payments position). This led Mundell (1961) to 
emphasize factor mobility as a pre-condition for OCA. Without factor mobility and with 
price and wage rigidities, it is up to the exchange rate to restore external balance. The 
national border, as we have seen, creates a discontinuity in price and wage adjustments 
and factor mobility. Without those borders the size of the optimal currency would 
change; this is the nexus because national sovereignty and optimal currency area 
(Cesarano 1997).  
Mundell went further and identified common shocks as a second pre-condition of 
OCA. McKinnon (1963) focused on openness of the economy as a criterion for OCA. 
The more open the economy, the less important the exchange rate in changing the 
country’s terms of trade; the small open economy is, in fact, defined to be a price taker in 
the world market. Kenen (1969) underscored product diversification--a more diversified 
economy is less prone to external shocks and hence does not require changes in the 




Without denying the valuable insights of this literature, its impact has been rather 
limited because its messages are inconclusive and inconsistent (Tavlas 1994). They are 
inconclusive in the sense that the criteria cannot be measured unambiguously and 
consequently weights cannot be assigned to them. They are inconsistent in the sense that 
one criterion points in one direction (e.g., a small open economy is very open but 
undiversified), while another points in the opposite direction (e.g., a large economy is 
relatively closed but has a high degree of product diversification). Furthermore, OCA 
criteria do not predict what geographical areas in the world should become monetary 
unions. Political factors that determine national borders also determine monetary unions.  
Two big events of the 1990s have reactivated interest in OCAs. The first was 
EMU, which has shown that the nexus because national sovereignty and monetary union 
can be broken. The second was the accelerating tempo of currency crises in the world: 
Mexico in 1994, Southeast Asia in 1997, Russia in 1998, Brazil in 1999, Argentina in 
2001, Uruguay, and again Brazil in 2002. While the proximate causes of the crises may 
be somewhat idiosyncratic, the spread of information and communication technology and 
rising financial integration are common to all of them. The speed with which we 
consummate transactions has raised the degree of currency substitution and has rendered 
currencies of small open economies uncompetitive in relation to those of large and stable 
economies.  
Cohen (2000, p. 29) asserts that “the number of monies that actually succeed in 
gaining some degree of general acceptance is sure to be reduced dramatically.” 
Dornbusch (2001) titles his article: “Fewer Monies, Better Monies;”  Rogoff  titles his: 




that the equilibrium ratio of independent currencies to countries falls as the number of 
countries in the world rises. Countries become smaller as their number increases. Since 
the relative importance of cross-border transactions is inversely related to country size, 
the value of a monetary union also rises because of its ability to lower trading costs. The 
denationalization of money, on the other hand, creates benefits and costs. The benefits 
accrue in the form of policy credibility for those countries that cannot pre-commit to 
stable inflation rates through domestic discretionary policies. The costs manifest 
themselves in the inability to use national monetary policy to offset idiosyncratic shocks. 
Common sense suggests that very small countries gain more in credibility than they lose 
by giving up discretionary monetary policy. The opposite is true for very large countries. 
The battle is fought in the middle. 
Returning to the theme of currency consolidation, the world has lost 14 national 
currencies and gained one since 1999 (Table 1). It would appear that the ratio of 
independent currencies to sovereign states has indeed dropped. But this measurement 
assumes that EMU, in steady state, is a collection of 12 sovereign states. If instead EMU 
is counted, expectationally, as one country the ratio has changed only marginally. In fact, 
the distinction between unilateral and multilateral MU alters the interpretation of  the 
Alesina-Barro model. If currency consolidation occurs through dollarization, the ratio of 
currencies to countries declines as the world becomes more atomistic. If instead currency 
consolidation occurs through multilateral MUs that also require political unifications, the 
ratio does not change. Two points are worth emphasizing.  
The first is that unilateral MUs, as opposed to multilateral MUs, face a severe 




and power. Take Argentina, for example, a country for which many experts had 
advocated dollarization as an improvement over the currency board (see, for example, 
Schuler and Stein (2000)). The government of Argentina made overtures to the US 
government about the terms of a possible dollarization, namely whether the United States  
would be willing to share seigniorage, give access to the Federal discount window, and 
cooperate on bank supervision. The response to that inquiry can be found in the 
‘International Monetary Stability Act of 1999’ (the Act).
7 This Act states unequivocally 
that “the Federal Reserve System has no obligation to act as a lender of last resort to the 
financial systems of dollarized countries; …no obligation to consider the economic 
conditions of dollarized countries when formulating or implementing monetary policy; 
and the supervision of financial institutions in dollarized countries remains the 
responsibility of those countries.” (Section 2, part (b)). The Act allows for the U.S. 
Treasury to rebate 85 per cent of the seigniorage resulting from currency flows after 
“official” dollarization; there is no rebate on the stock of currency before official 
dollarization. To enjoy the rebate on the new currency flows, dollarized countries would 
have to surrender U.S. Treasury securities and receive in exchange an equal amount of   
U.S. currency and interest-bearing U.S. perpetuities. The Act states that coupon payment 
on these perpetuities “is rendered null and void upon a United States declaration of war 
on the country or a publicly issued statement by the Secretary [of the Treasury] that the 
country is no longer officially dollarized…” (Section 6).   
The declaration-of-war clause underscores the nexus between money and power. 
Countries that are considering the adoption of the dollar as their legal tender cannot 
                                                 




ignore the possibility that their monetary systems may be disrupted by the United States 
in times of conflict. It happened to Noriega’s Panama in March of 1988, when the U.S. 
government put a payment squeeze on the country. Banks were closed for two months 
and Panamanian real GDP suffered a sharp drop (Moreno-Villalaz 1999). These factors 
may explain why fully dollarized economies tend to be small. What country of the size of 
Argentina or Brazil  would acquiesce politically to a clause that its monetary system 
would be under potential threat of a foreign government? 
The second point is that multilateral MUs are much more complex than unilateral 
MUs and require, to function properly, a high degree of inter-state cooperation (Cohen 
1993) and fiscal redistribution (Kenen 1969). It is exactly these aspects that give rise to 
the prediction that multilateral MUs cannot be stable without ultimately becoming fiscal 
or political unions. Thus, in an expectational sense, the East Caribbean Currency Area, 
the West African Monetary Union, the Central African Monetary Union and EMU imply 
a long-run reduction in the number of countries, leaving the equilibrium ratio of 
independent currencies to countries unchanged.   
 
The trade-money causality  
Frankel and Rose (1998) and Rose (2000) have questioned the direction of causality from 
“real” integration to monetary integration and have proposed instead the hypothesis that 
OCA criteria are endogenous. The direction of causality can go the other way, with 
monetary unification enhancing economic integration, not only through a higher degree 
of price transparency and lower transaction costs but also through more predictable costs 
                                                                                                                                                 




and product differentiation. Monetary unification is an engine of structural change and as 
such generates endogenous OCA criteria.  
 To test this proposition, Rose estimates (2) above and finds that the estimate of  
α6, the MU coefficient, ranges  from 0.87 in 1970 to 1.51 in 1990 and 1.21 for the pooled 
regression (Rose 2000, Table 2). Using the latter and noting that exp(1.21) = 3.35, the 
implication is that monetary unification can more than treble trade, an effect that dwarfs 
the impact of exchange rate variability on trade and is 25 percent larger than the noted 
regional effect.  
Quite a controversy has risen around Rose’s large empirical effect of MU on 
trade. For Persson (2001), the countries in Rose’s MU group are much too different in 
terms of income, dimension and geographical proximity from the countries in the control 
group. Just like in medical experiments, the treated group must be made homogenous 
with respect to the control group. After rebalancing the two groups, Persson re-estimates 
the gravity model and obtains much lower estimates of  α6  and much higher standard 
errors. A similar, but narrower, objection has been raised by Mélitz (2002) who finds that 
the selection bias of the MU group stems from the fact that these countries share close 
trade relations and political affinity. Using the same data, Mélitz disentangles regional 
trade agreement and political union effects from MU effects and arrives at a preferred 
estimate of α6 that implies that MU doubles trade. For Pakko and Wall (2001), the 
problem with Rose’s results stems from the estimation technique. Countries differ in so 
many ways that it is impossible to capture all differences by expanding the list of FEAT 
(see eq. (1)). Pakko and Wall advocate the specification of fixed effects to correct the 
                                                                                                                                                 




bias that may arise from omitted variables. They re-estimate the model using the same 
Rose (2000) data set and find that both  α5  and  α6 are statistically not different from zero. 
Also Glick and Rose (2002) re-estimate (2) with fixed effects but on a larger data set 
(1948 to 1997) than Rose (2000) and more observations of  switches in and out of MUs, 
and find an estimate of  α 6 that is half of the estimated  α 6 obtained from pooled data.  
In sum, the endogenous OCA literature focuses on the role of MU as a catalyst of 
‘real’ integration, in contrast to the passive role of money assigned by the traditional 
OCA literature. This idea finds more favor than the quantitative impact of monetary 
unification on trade flows. The state of the art is that the estimate of  α6  is sensitive to 
sample and empirical methodology. As to borders,  we recall that sustainable multilateral 
MUs require a permanent modification of the national border in the sense of a fiscal and 
or political unification. The border is the real exogenous force in the expansion of 
multilateral MUs.  
  
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has dealt with the constraints that national and regional borders place on the 
international integration of goods, services, capital, and monies. Despite the clamor of 
anti-globalists, the world is far from an integrated village. It took us almost a hundred 
years to regain the degree of integration that existed during the gold standard. Integration 
today remains imperfect because national borders translate into trading costs, including 
differences in monetary regimes. Political borders shelter many goods and services from 
external competition and, consequently, represent a critical  exogenous force in the 




  Borders are thicker for the small countries than the large countries and adjust to 
the inter-play of bilateral and multilateral trading costs. Not surprisingly, it is small 
countries that tend to be the most favorable to a liberal trade system. The trend of 
regionalism has softened or, in some cases, pushed outward national borders, and in the 
process has created new biases. Not only is there more trade inside RTAs than across 
RTAs, but integration differs across different regions of the world. 
The significance of the border goes beyond goods and services. It affects physical 
and finance capital as well. Physical capital is more mobile within the regions of a country 
than across countries, and the same is true for finance capital. Finance capital is more mobile 
than physical capital. Financial integration in RTAs like the EU is higher than global 
integration. As it is true for trade, national borders are a constraint to the expansion of the 
financial economy; regional arrangements have expanded national borders and created 
borders of their own.  
          After World War I virtually each country had its own fiduciary money and restrained 
currency substitution. Monies went in unison with flags and airlines. The speed of financial 
integration seems to call for massive currency consolidation. Yet, the record shows that 
except for small cases of unilateral MUs, the significant reductions in the number of 
currencies have occurred through the formation of multilateral MUs, such as the East 
Caribbean Currency Union, the West African Monetary Union, the Central African 
Monetary Union and the European Monetary Union . But since multilateral MUs cannot 
be stable without ultimately becoming fiscal or political unions, it is not clear whether 
financial integration will ultimately reduce the ratio of independent monies to sovereign 
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